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ABSTRACT

ATTENTIONAL AND EMOTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF EMOTIONAL ACCEPTANCE
AND SUPPRESSION IN AN ELEVATED ANXIETY SAMPLE

May 2017

Natalie Arbid, B.A. Loyola Marymount University
M.A. University of Massachusetts, Boston
Directed by Professor Lizabeth Roemer

Acceptance- based strategies have been incorporated into behavioral therapies for anxiety
and other disorders (e.g., Roemer & Orsillo, 2009). Experimental literature is in need of better,
more nuances assessment of the consequences of acceptance (Kohl, Rief & Glombiewski, 2012).
Therefore, this study specifically examined the way in which acceptance can increase attentional
flexibility and recovery from stress, which are important factors in the maintenance of anxiety
disorders (Cisler & Koster, 2010). This experimental study compared acceptance and
suppression of emotional experiences, following exposure to fearful stimuli (i.e., images and film
clip), to a control condition. Results indicated that there was no significant relation between
dimensional self-ratings of trait and state emotion regulation ability, trait acceptance,
disengagement from viewing distressing images, and recovery from distress. Experimental
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analyses revealed that no emotion regulation strategy- acceptance or suppression- allowed
individuals to disengage and recover from the negative images significantly more quickly. Also
no emotion regulation strategy led to significantly lower levels of self-reported negative affect
and higher willingness to view more distressing images. However, nonsignificant trends of
medium to large effect sizes emerged, with unexpected correlational findings suggesting that
trait levels of experiential avoidance and emotion regulation difficulties were associated with the
ability to disengage from images, while acceptance instructions may have facilitated
disengagement following the task.
There were several limitations to this study. First the sample size was small limiting the
ability to detect effects of the independent variable (i.e., emotion regulation instructions). Also
randomization was not successful and the conditions were imbalanced on several key variables.
Lastly the mood induction was not successful in inducing fear in this sample, therefore limiting
ability to comment on participants’ reaction to distress and recovery from distress.
Given that there were several limitations to this study, it is important for future research to make
the study alterations recommended and conduct further research on this topic.
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CHAPTER 1
SPECIFIC AIMS
Research has consistently demonstrated that emotion regulation skills are important to
psychological well-being (Gross & Jazeieri, 2014). Emotion regulation is the process in which
individuals attempt to influence the emotions they have, when they have them, and how they are
expressed and experienced (Gross, 1998). This is a dynamic and temporal process that involves
the adjustment of emotional experiences before, during, and after an event elicits emotions; it
also includes the valuation or appraisal of one’s emotional experience (Gross, 2015). This
process can be relatively automatic or a habitual response pattern that happens in or outside
awareness (Amstadter, 2008), consciously or automatically (Mauss, Cook, & Gross, 2007), and
varies based on contextual and personal factors. Specifically, emotion regulation difficulties or
emotion dsyregulation has been linked to anxiety disorders such as Generalized Anxiety
Disorder (GAD; Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005), Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD;
Aldao 2014; Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005), and Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD;Tull, Gratz, Salter, & Roemer, 2004) – for a review see Amstadter (2008).
A common way in which individuals manage their emotional experience, and a
maintenance factor in several anxiety disorders, is avoidance. A specific type of avoidance is the
avoidance of internal experiences, such as emotions, thoughts, and bodily sensations. This
unwillingness to stay in contact with internal sensations is known as experiential avoidance (EA;
Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). EA has been the focus of several
acceptance-based behavioral therapies (ABBTs), including Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). The success of these therapies
has been in part due to their focus on the reduction of EA and the cultivation of acceptance.
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Acceptance is understood in opposition to EA and is defined as an allowance of internal
experiences without efforts to rid oneself of them; it also includes a quality of relating to one’s
internal experiences by turning toward them in an open, nonjudgmental way (Hayes et al., 2006;
Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 2004). Several investigations have found that reduction of EA and
increases in acceptance predict treatment response, reduce anxiety symptomology, and are an
overall mechanism of action (Hayes, Orsillo & Roemer, 2010; Arch & Craske, 2008; Arch,
Wolitzky-Taylor, Eifert, & Craske, 2012a; Twohig et al., 2010; Niles et al., 2014).
There has been an increase in the number of experimental studies that have attempted to
dismantle ABBTs and investigate acceptance and experiential avoidance outside of treatment. A
meta-analysis of these studies found that acceptance was not significantly associated with
psychopathology, yet effect sizes were small to medium and in the predicted direction, possibly
indicating a need for better assessment of the construct (Aldao, 2010). In another meta-analysis
(Kohl, Rief, & Glombiewski, 2012) acceptance failed to demonstrate general superiority over
other emotion regulation strategies, but the large amount of variability in type of manipulation,
outcome measures, and comparison groups allowed for no firm conclusions and heeds cautious
interpretation of the null findings. This evidence points to the need for better, more nuanced
assessment of the construct. Acceptance is not the reduction of symptoms, but it is a change in
the relationship to the experience. Therefore, conclusions based on acceptance’s effects on
down-regulation of negative affect or other symptoms may be limited by this narrow outcome
measurement. As such, I assessed acceptance in terms of recovery from distress, attentional
disengagement from threat, negative affect, and behavioral action, to better capture the ways in
which acceptance is effective and to expand on the experimental literature of EA and acceptance.
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I was particularly interested in understanding the impact acceptance and experiential
avoidance have on attention while an individual is engaged in an emotionally distressing task and
their impact on recovery from emotional arousal. Emotional and expressive suppression have
been used as proxy measures of experiential avoidance, therefore I used emotional suppression in
this investigation as it most closely models EA. I examined whether acceptance could facilitate
individuals’ ability to disengage and flexibily move attention from emotionally arousing (i.e.,
fearful) images and recover from this heightened arousal. An attentional interference task helped
elucidate if acceptance allowed individuals to have an emotional experience, while still engaging
and disengaging in other activities.
Overarching Aims and Hypotheses
Correlational Aims
1. Examine how dimensional self-ratings of trait1 emotion regulation and acceptance are related
to the heightened ability to disengage from and recovery following an emotionally arousing task.
a. It was hypothesized that emotion regulation abilities would be positively related to
ability to disengage and recover from an emotionally arousing task.
b. It was hypothesized that acceptance would be positively associated with ability to
disengage and recover from an emotionally arousing task.
c. It was hypothesized that state emotion regulation abilities would be positively related
to ability to disengage and recover from an emotionally arousing task.

1

The term trait is used in the adult emotion regulation literature to describe the ways in which
individuals use these strategies habitually on their own without the impact of an intervention.
This is usually assessed via self-report.
3

Experimental Aims
2. Determine which emotion regulation strategies- acceptance or suppression- would allow
individuals to better disengage and recover from an emotionally arousing task.
a. It was hypothesized that those instructed to use acceptance strategies would better
disengage and recover from an emotionally arousing task compared to those using
suppression or no strategy.
b. It was hypothesized that those instructed to use acceptance would report lower levels
of negative affect at the end of the study.
c. It was hypothesized that those instructed to use acceptance would be more willing to
view another set of images in the task.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
In this review I investigate current understandings of emotion regulation and how they
relate to anxiety disorders. I focus specifically on how experiential avoidance (EA) and
acceptance can play a role in modulating emotional experience. Next, I review the experimental
literature on acceptance and EA, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the current
literature and explain how this investigation can improve and expand on these studies. Finally, I
review the specific ways in which I assessed the impact of acceptance and how these more
nuanced assessment methods can help us better understand acceptance and its impact on
individuals with anxiety disorders.
Emotion Regulation (ER)
Models of Emotion Regulation. There are several conceptualizations of emotion
regulation (ER) in the literature (Thompson, 1994; Berking, 2008; Gross, 1998,2015; Gratz &
Roemer, 2004). In a recent editorial review, Tull and Aldao (2015) explain that the
commonalities in these understandings are their conceptualization of emotion regulation as a way
in which individuals have an influence over, and respond to their emotional experience. Here, I
provide a small sample of the ways in which emotion regulation can be understood before
focusing specifically on experiential avoidance and acceptance.
Some models of emotion regulation include extrinsic and intrinsic processes that monitor,
evaluate, and modify emotion to accomplish goals (Thompson, 1994). Another describes specific
dimensions of adaptive emotion regulation that include awareness, understanding, and
acceptance of emotional experience, the ability to act in accordance with goals, and the ability to
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use different strategies flexibly (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). Synthesizing and building upon some
of these theories, Berking et al. (2008) proposed a model that is built on the assumption that
mental health is the ability to modify emotions in a desired direction and accept and tolerate
undesired emotions. This theory conceptualizes adaptive emotion regulation as an interaction of
nine specific skills, including identification and awareness of emotional experience, consciously
processing emotions/being aware of emotions, identification and labeling emotions, interpreting
emotion related body sensations correctly, understanding the prompts of emotions, supporting
oneself in emotionally distressing situations, actively modifying negative emotions in order to
feel better, accepting emotions, being resilient to /tolerating negative emotions, and confronting
emotionally distressing situations in order to attain important goals.
Lastly, there is a temporal process model (Gross, 1998) that describes how individuals
use strategies to influence their emotional experience before, during, and after they experience
emotions. These conceptualizations are all useful and the utility of each depends on the research
question at hand. When the question is framed around the positive, negative, short-term and
long-term consequences of emotion regulation strategies, Gross’ process model of emotion
regulation (Gross, 1998a, 1998b) is the most widely used (Gratz, Weiss, & Tull, 2015).
The Gross model includes five strategies, divided into two categories of regulation
strategies: antecedent-focused strategies that occur before the emotional response and responsefocused strategies that occur after the emotional response. An extended version of this model has
been developed, which includes a valuation system (Gross, 2015). This valuation system is the
appraisal of our internal and external worlds, and the use of that information to determine
whether stimuli or experiences are indifferent, good, or bad (Gross, 2015). This valuation
system is used within the whole model, both in the antecedent and response strategies.
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Experimental work most often uses this model as a whole to help operationalize emotion
regulation. Therefore I have framed this investigation within the Gross process model (Gross,
1998a, 1998b), while also using others to help measure trait emotion regulation abilities (Gratz &
Roemer, 2004).
Emotion Regulation and Anxiety Disorders. As the study of emotion regulation has
grown, so has an understanding of the role emotion regulation plays in anxiety and stress
disorders (Amstadter, 2008). Importantly, psychologists have learned that emotion dysregulation
plays a vital role in the experience of those with these disorders. For instance, individuals with
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) report higher levels of intense emotions, difficulty
understanding emotions, negative reactivity to their emotional state, and maladaptive emotional
response management (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2002; Turk, Heimberg, Luterek,
Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). Similarly, research has shown that individuals with social anxiety
disorder (SAD) have difficulty identifying emotions, pay less attention to emotions, have
difficulty repairing negative mood states, are fearful of experiencing emotions (Turk et al.,
2005), and use expressive suppression (Werner, Goldin, Ball, Heimberg, & Gross, 2011) more
than nonclinical samples. Also, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been associated with
thought suppression (Tull, Gratz, Salters, & Roemer, 2004; Lee, Witte, Weathers, & Davis,
2015) and avoidance of internal experiences (Lee et al., 2015). Preliminary evidence suggests
that obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) symptoms (e.g., washing, checking, doubting,
obsessions, ordering) are related to a poor understanding of emotions, fear of positive and
negative emotions, and fear of anxiety, which are features of the emotion dysregulation (Stern,
Nota, Heimberg, Holaway, & Coles, 2014). These symptoms also relate to difficulties with
impulse control, limited access to strategies for emotion regulation, and a lack of emotional
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clarity (de la Cruz et al., 2013). As this evidence suggests, emotion regulation is crucial to
understanding the maintenance factors for several anxiety disorders. Specifically, negative
reactivity to and avoidance of emotional experience is a common factor among these disorders.
Methods, such as acceptance, that target reactivity to and avoidance of emotions are often
components of treatments for these disorders (e.g., Twohig et al., 2010; Osman, Wilson,
Storaasli, & McNeil, 2006; Arch and Craske, 2008; Niles et al., 2014). For this reason,
experiential avoidance and acceptance were the focus of this investigation.
Experiential Avoidance and Acceptance. Experiential avoidance (EA) is the
unwillingness to remain in contact with private internal experiences, such as thoughts, bodily
sensations, emotions, memories or behaviors, along with the effort or action taken to alter the
form or frequency of these internal experiences (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl,
1996). Avoidance of painful memories, experiences, or emotions is a natural part of the human
experience. Individuals are motivated to avoid or get rid of these negative internal and external
experiences because of the psychological discomfort they cause. Although avoidance can be
adaptive (e.g., avoiding physical danger), when it becomes a habitual manner of responding to
emotional material or experiences that are not necessarily dangerous, rigid behavioral and
emotional patterns can develop. In particular, individuals with anxiety disorders often experience
intrusive, distressing thoughts, attend to threatening material more often, and have strong beliefs
that these experiences are unavoidable, and therefore use avoidance as a way to cope (SaltersPedneault, Tull, & Roemer, 2004). Avoidance of emotional material does not allow individuals
to engage with these internal experiences in a new way that facilitates new learning to take place
(Salters-Pedneault et al., 2004). These habitual patterns of avoidance can spread to a wide range
of contexts and eventually become maladaptive, not allowing for new and corrective learning to
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take place, fostering disengagement from life, and restricting valued actions (Roemer & Orsillo,
2009). Experiential avoidance becomes negatively reinforcing because it seems effective in
eliminating distressing internal experiences in the short-term, but the long-term paradoxical
effects are that it actually increases distress and restricts individuals’ lives (Hayes et al., 1996;
Lee et al., 2010; Wegner, 2011).
As evidence of the pervasiveness of experiential avoidance among the anxiety disorders
mounted, it became a target of several behavioral treatments, such as Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999) and other Acceptance-Based Behavioral
Therapies (ABBTs; Roemer, Orsillo, & Salters-Pednault, 2008). With the success of these
treatments, investigations on how they actually work, or through which mechanism they produce
change, have shown strong evidence that the reduction of EA is a mechanism of action (HayesSkelton, S. A., Usmani, A., Lee, J. K., Roemer, L., & Orsillo, S. M., 2012; Arch & Craske 2008;
Niles et al., 2014). The reduction of experiential avoidance has been captured with the concept of
experiential acceptance. Experiential acceptance2 refers to the allowance of internal experiences,
the ability to notice and pay attention to internal experiences, and the ability to turn towards
these experiences in a nonjudgmental way (Hayes et al., 1996). In an ABBT for individuals with
GAD, Hayes, Orsillo and Roemer (2010) found that the larger session-by-session increases in
acceptance reported by clients over the course of therapy, the more likely that they were later
considered a treatment responder. When cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and ACT were
compared in treating individuals with heterogeneous anxiety disorders, improvements in EA
occurred across both conditions and the ACT group reported significantly less EA at the 12month follow up (Arch et al., 2012b). In another randomized clinical trial for individuals
2

Experiential acceptance and acceptance are interchangeable. For the remainder of the document
acceptance will be used.
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diagnosed with OCD, ACT was compared to progressive relaxation training (Twohig et al.,
2010). Participants in the ACT condition showed significantly greater reductions in experiential
avoidance from pre-treatment to post-treatment compared with progressive relaxation training
participants. Dalrymple and colleagues (2007) conducted a waitlist control study with a group of
individuals diagnosed with social anxiety disorder who received ACT and exposure. The authors
found that earlier decreases in EA predicted later symptom change.
There is strong empirical support for the increase of acceptance and decrease of EA in
ABBTs, especially for individuals diagnosed with various anxiety disorders. This evidence
points to acceptance being an important mechanism of change in manualized or comprehensive
treatments (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). Further research is needed to elucidate the specific ways in
which acceptance brings about symptom change in these clinical samples. With an experimental
design, this investigation determined the effects acceptance has on individuals who are
experiencing elevated levels of anxious arousal and general anxiety.
Experiential Avoidance, Acceptance, and Emotion Regulation
Integration of the experiential avoidance, acceptance, and emotion regulation literature
can be helpful in investigating these constructs in the context of an experimental study. There is
theoretical and empirical evidence that EA and acceptance are opposing ways to regulate one’s
emotional experience (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008; Blackledge & Hayes, 2001; Webb, Miles,
& Sheeran, 2012). Using Gross’s (1998) process model, there is disagreement as to whether
acceptance is an antecedent focused strategy (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012), a response
focused strategy (Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008) or a combination of both (Wolgast, LarsGunnar, & Viborg, 2013; Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 2008). Webb and colleagues
(2012) conceptualize acceptance as an antecedent focused strategy that involves cognitive
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change. This classification stems from an understanding of acceptance as reappraisal of the
emotional experience (Webb et al., 2012). Acceptance as an antecedent strategy implies an
internalization of this approach toward internal experiences and emotion generation. In other
words, this is when acceptance becomes an established habitual pattern of approaching and
responding. We could also understand this as the use of acceptance within an experimental
framework where individuals are instructed to use acceptance before an emotional reaction. On
the other hand, among individuals first beginning an ABBT, acceptance can be used as a
response strategy to help change the already established problematic relationships to one’s
internal experience. This dichotomous view of acceptance can be helpful to operationalize it in
these instances, but is also problematic because it does not capture the complexity of acceptance
used across multiple contexts (i.e., when implemented before an emotional experiences, used
after an emotionally triggering event, and even during an emotional experience). Acceptance can
be understood as actually both antecedent and response focused, depending on the context and
the interaction between the environment, the individual, and their ability to implement aspects of
acceptance when needed. Acceptance incorporates elements of antecedent-focused emotion
regulation via reappraisal of the acceptability of emotional experience and response-focused
emotion regulation when allowing the experience of emotion without attempts to alter or
suppress it (Wolgast, Lars- Gunnar, & Viborg, 2013; Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer,
2008).
Revisiting Gross’s (2015) updated process model of emotion regulation, it more clearly
states that emotion regulation is not linear but a cyclical process. A strategy is implemented, we
receive feedback either from ourselves or the environment about its usefulness, we form a
valuation or judgment of its efficacy, and finally make a decision about when, where, and how it
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may be implemented again. Acceptance can be used as an emotion regulation strategy to
approach an interaction, then used after the interaction, and finally can be used to approach our
own emotions in response to the interaction. Placing acceptance into this cycle sheds light on the
multiple understandings of acceptance and the complexities of operationalizing it.
In this investigation I used a response- focused conceptualization of acceptance for
several reasons. First, the target sample is individuals experiencing elevated levels of anxious
arousal and generalized anxiety. These individuals may already experience difficulties with their
internal experiences and therefore instructing them to approach their reactions in an accepting
way will require a response-focused approach. For example, as mentioned earlier, novices in
treatment initially use acceptance as a response modulation strategy. Since a broader aim of this
investigation is to better understand the effects of a component of treatment (i.e., acceptance), I
used clinical work as a reference point. Secondly, I understand acceptance and cognitive
reappraisal or cognitive change as related but distinct concepts (Wolgast, 2013; Hofmann &
Asmundson 2008). Although acceptance is usually used in response to negative judgment of
response patterns, it does not promote a reappraisal of this response or situation into something
better or worse. Acceptance includes attempts to place no value judgment on internal experiences
and to understand them merely as responses. For example, using cognitive reappraisal would
involve reinterpreting a failing grade on an exam as being due to the difficulty of the test instead
of one’s lack of studying and preparation. In contrast, the use of acceptance would involve
allowing oneself to feel disappointed, acknowledge these feelings as feelings, and approaching
oneself gently without harsh judgment.
Before turning toward how both acceptance and experiential avoidance have been
evaluated in the experimental literature, I explain how EA is operationalized. Experiential
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avoidance has been tested via the use of suppression of both internal experiences and external
output. Internal or emotional suppression is the suppression of internal experiences, such as
thoughts, memories or emotions (e.g., instructing people to suppress their internal emotional
response/experience). External or expressive suppression is the elimination of facial and other
outward signs of emotion (e.g., instructing people to conceal their facial expression when
emotions arise). Both internal and external suppression have been shown to have paradoxical
effects; in the short-term, suppression can alleviate distress, while the long-term effects cause an
increase in the symptoms (Wegner et al 1987; Abramowitz, Tolin & Street, 2001). I focused on
internal or emotional suppression in this investigation since it most aligns with the definition of
EA.
Review of Experimental Studies of Experiential Avoidance and Acceptance. A body
of experimental literature investigates the emotional, physiological, and behavioral consequences
of suppression and acceptance. Tull, Jakupcak, and Roemer (2010) found that men using
emotional suppression compared to allowance of emotions experienced higher levels of distress
after listening to situations of men failing to conform to gender role norms (gender role stressrelated distress). Moreover, responding to these situations, men using emotional suppression had
significant increases in heart rate, and 23.5% of them were unwilling to participate in the
experiment again (compared to 0% in the emotional allowance group). In a group of individuals
diagnosed with anxiety and depression, those who were instructed to use emotional suppression
had poorer recovery in that negative affect subsided to a lesser extent compared to those who
used emotional acceptance in response to an aversive film clip (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown,
& Hofmann, 2006). Also the heart rate of both the suppression and acceptance groups increased
from anticipation to recovery, yet participants in the suppression group showed an increase in
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HR from anticipation to exposure, and a decrease in HR from exposure to recovery. Hofmann,
Heering, Sawyer, and Asnaanu (2009) also found that when individuals were asked to use
suppression (both expressive and emotional suppression) while giving a speech, they reported
higher anxiety than those in the reappraisal group and increased heart rate compared to both
reappraisal and acceptance. There was no difference in levels of reported anxiety between the
acceptance and reappraisal group and no difference between the acceptance and suppression
groups. During a CO2 challenge, participants with panic disorder using acceptance reported
significantly less anxiety than those in the suppression group, controlling for resting state anxiety
(Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). Also individuals in the acceptance group were more
willing to participate in a second challenge than those in the suppression and control groups, with
no difference between the suppression and control groups. In an investigation comparing
cognitive reappraisal and acceptance in a healthy sample, participants in both conditions reported
significantly less negative emotion when compared to a control condition in response to fear and
sadness film clips (Wolgast, Lundh, & Viborg, 2011). Both of these strategies were also related
to less behavioral avoidance as measured by reluctance to view the same film clip again.
Importantly, there was no association between self-reported negative emotion and avoidance in
the acceptance condition, indicating that those using acceptance had a higher tolerance for
aversive emotional experiences and were possibly less likely to resort to avoidance (Wolgast et
al., 2011).
This evidence suggests that experiential suppression is related to increases in distress,
poorer recovery from elevated levels of negative affect, and higher levels of self-reported
anxiety. On the other hand, evidence points to acceptance relating to more rapid recovery from
aversive stimuli, lower levels of self-reported anxiety, and more behavioral willingness to engage
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in emotionally evocative tasks. Both suppression and acceptance were related to similar
increases in HR. Importantly these relationships were found in different contexts such as in
response to film clips, in response to a stressful social situation (i.e., giving a speech on a
controversial topic), and during a CO2 challenge.
A meta-analysis on emotion regulation strategies found that acceptance was not
significantly associated with psychopathology, yet effect sizes were small to medium and in the
predicted direction, possibly indicating a need for better assessment of the strategies (Aldao,
2010). In another meta-analysis, acceptance failed to have a general superiority over other
emotion regulation strategies (Kohl, Rief & Glombiewski, 2012). These findings should be
interpreted with caution because of the large amount of variability in type of manipulation,
outcomes, and comparison groups. This meta- analysis only used 14 studies and investigated the
use of acceptance in relation to pain tolerance, pain intensity, negative affect, and
psychophysiology. Unsurprisingly, acceptance was efficacious in increasing pain tolerance but
not in decreasing pain intensity compared to other strategies. This is consistent with the
conceptualization of acceptance as an allowance of internal experiences and a letting go of
control because the ability to tolerate pain increased, but change in pain intensity did not
improve. This evidence points to acceptance helping individuals to engage in behavior that is
meaningful and allowing for better functioning, while still experiencing distress. Acceptance was
not more effective than other emotion regulation strategies in reducing negative affect and
psychophysiological arousal. This review (Kohl et al., 2012) also included qualitative
information, which indicated that clinical samples were more likely to show an effect on
negative affect, although not significantly so. This information is important to consider since
acceptance may be best suited for individuals experiencing clinically elevated symptoms.
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In sum, acceptance is not the reduction of symptoms but is a change in the relationship to
the experience, therefore conclusions based on its effects on down-regulation of negative affect
or other symptoms may be limited and only apply to a narrow set of outcomes. Measuring
change or effects should be broader when the goals are not only symptom reduction but also
improvement in quality of and engagement in life. For example, ABBTs help individuals not
only manage symptoms, but also identify values in order to engage in life in a full and
meaningful way. Therefore assessment of acceptance needs to tap into constructs such as
recovery from distress, engagement in tasks, behavioral action, and attentional capacity in order
to better measure its’ effectiveness in different contexts.
Assessment of Recovery. In a study mentioned prior, Campbell-Sills et al. (2006) found
that among individuals diagnosed with anxiety and/or mood disorders, acceptance manifested a
greater decrease in negative affect in a recovery period after viewing a distressing film in
comparison to those in the suppression group. Two other studies found that individuals in the
acceptance groups were significantly more willing to engage in a second CO2 challenge than
other groups (Levitt et al., 2004) and more willing to participate in another distressing task (Tull
et al., 2010). In a study examining the use of emotional suppression and acceptance in a sample
of depressed individuals, results indicated that, although the acceptance group experienced more
sadness in response to a sad film clip, their level of sadness decreased more steeply in the
recovery period (Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 2008). This evidence points to the ways
in which acceptance may have residual effects that do not appear in the height of distress.
Acceptance may facilitate a quicker path to recovery from a heightened state of arousal.
Recovery can be measured in the form of quicker or more drastic reductions in negative affect,
physiological arousal, and, in the case of this investigation, attentional engagement.
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Assessment of Attention and Disengagement. The attentional bias toward threat in
anxiety disorders has been studied extensively (See Cisler & Koster, 2010 for review). This is
the tendency for individuals with high trait anxiety to turn their attention to more threatening or
negative information in the environment more than non-clinically anxious individuals do (BarHain, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermnas-Kranenburg & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; MacLeod, Mathews &
Tata, 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). This finding has been consistent across anxiety disorders
and across the use of different experimental paradigms used to detect and measure this bias
(Cisler & Koster, 2010). Studies indicate that anxiety is maintained and exacerbated through
prolonged attentional engagement with threatening information (Constans, 2005; Elzinga &
Bemmer, 2002). Relatedly, an important component of attentional bias is disengagement from
the threatening stimuli; evidence demonstrates that anxious individuals have difficulty
disengaging (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere & De Houwer, 2006; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere
et al., 2004). Also, the ability to flexibly use attention in arousing situations can help alleviate
distress (Bardeen & Orcutt, 2011; Bardeen & Read, 2010). Experimental tasks that measure
attention can help elucidate attentional flexibility capacities. Specifically, a dual task paradigm in
which individuals engage in an emotionally evocative task (i.e., viewing distressing images),
while then engaging in another (i.e., responding to an auditory tone), can help elucidate the
ability to disengage from the images and respond to the second stimulus. Several theories
(Easterbrook,1959; Eysenck, Derakshan, Santo, & Calvo, 2007; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, &
Viding, 2004) propose that when the primary task is cognitively demanding and the secondary
stimulus is less salient, performance on the secondary task will suffer. Incorporating an emotion
regulation strategy may change the way in which the evocative images are experienced or
responded to, therefore influencing the flexibility of attentional response to the secondary
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stimulus. The use of different emotion regulation strategies may facilitate the loosening of fixed
attention on threatening stimuli.
Attentional ability can serve as a unique and important outcome of the use of acceptance
and suppression. Ortner, Zelazo, and Anderson (2013) investigated the effects of reappraisal and
suppression on attention using a dual task paradigm. Participants were significantly slower to
respond to the tone when using reappraisal and suppression than the control group (view
condition) while viewing unpleasant images. This finding indicates that emotion regulation
strategies utilize cognitive demands such as working memory and attention, therefore slowing
their performance. There was a post-picture presentation period that revealed no effect of
condition, but exploratory analyses revealed that participants using suppression in response to
unpleasant images were significantly slower to respond to the distractor stimulus (i.e., tone).
Similar work has been done using this paradigm measuring the effects of mindfulness on
attention (Ortner, Kilner, & Zelazo, 2007), but to our knowledge no one has yet to use this
attentional paradigm to investigate acceptance. This investigation was a replication and extension
of the Ornter et al. (2013) and Ortner et al. (2007) studies with a sample of individuals who are
experiencing elevated levels of anxious arousal and general anxiety, and examining the effects of
acceptance and experiential suppression.
The Current Study
Given the findings that acceptance may be beneficial for individuals with anxiety
disorders, but not by reducing distress immediately, the current study expands our understanding
of the effects of acceptance by examining how acceptance relates to 1) ability to disengage
attention from an emotional task, and 2) affective and attentional recovery following an
emotional task. I have investigated these relationships using both correlational and experimental
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methods. First, I predicted that higher self-reported trait levels of emotion regulation abilities
and acceptance would predict disengagement and recovery from an emotionally arousing
laboratory task, and that state levels of emotion regulation would also predict disengagement and
recovery. Then I predicted that experimental instruction to accept emotions would lead to better
disengagement of attention during a second administration of the emotional arousing laboratory
task, as well as attentional and emotional (i.e., negative affect) recovery after the task. I also
predicted that those in the acceptance group would be more willing to engage in viewing another
set of images. A sample of individuals with elevated levels of anxiety was recruited, as evidence
suggests that acceptance may be better suited for individuals with elevated levels of anxiety
(Kohl et al., 2012) and because of the need for more experimental work to be done with clinical
populations rather than with healthy controls, to allow more generalizability of findings to the
target populations (Mennin et al., 2007).
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
Broad Procedural Overview
For this study, I recruited the sample from University of Massachusetts Boston, an urban
commuter school. The investigation consisted of two parts: part one included prescreening
measures (n=302) and part two was an experimental study (n=18). The purpose of collecting the
prescreening measures was to recruit individuals who were currently experiencing elevated
levels of general anxiety or anxious arousal for the experimental portion of the study, as well as
to assess trait levels of emotion regulation skills and acceptance for the correlational analyses.
Recruitment for part one of the study included email blasts that included a Psychdata link to
measures that students completed if they were interested in and consented to participate in the
study. The prescreening measures are described in more detail below. All individuals 18 years of
age or older and who had spoken English for at least 5 years were eligible to complete part one.
Those who completed part one were either entered into a raffle to win a $50 Amazon gift card or
received psychology course credit. Students were not able to receive both forms of payment.
Prescreening measures were used to determine eligibility for the experimental portion of
the investigation (part two). Inclusion criteria for part two included, individuals who were 18
years of age or older, English speakers for at least five years, had the ability to hear and see,
indicated that they were interested in being contacted for a related study, and scored at or above
the moderate threshold of the stress or anxiety subscales of the Depression, Anxiety, Stress
Scales 21 (DASS-Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Those who met all of these inclusion criteria
were sent an email invitation to participate in part two, the experimental portion of this
investigation. Those who completed part 2 received monetary compensation ($20).
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Recruitment
I sent two emails blasts in the Spring 2016 semester to recruit participants at University
of Massachusetts Boston. A flow chart of recruitment and enrollment is presented below. A total
of 459 participants began the online questionnaire and 302 completed the questionnaire. One
hundred forty two participants met criteria for part two of the study, meaning that they scored at
or above the moderate rage of the anxiety and/or stress scales of the DASS (DASS-21; Lovibond
& Lovibond, 1995). Of those, 72 were willing to be contacted for future studies and 50 were
contacted via email to participate. A total of 26 participants responded and were randomized to
condition. Two participants no-showed several times and one participant decided to not
participate due to health problems. Twenty-three participants completed part 2; however, two
individuals were excluded from analyses due to an early syntax error in DASS scores, which
meant they were ineligible. One participant was excluded due a technical problem because they
did not hear any tones during the experiment. Lastly, two other participants were excluded
because they did not respond to any auditory tones and had no laboratory task data. A total of 18
participants (6 per condition) were included in the analyses.
Began online questionnaire (n=459)
Completed Questionnaire (n= 302)

Excluded (n= 256)
♦ Did not complete quest. (n= 157)
♦ Did not complete DASS21 (n= 99)
Met study criteria (n= 142)

Wanted to be contacted for experimental
study (n= 72)
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Contacted to participate (n=50)

Randomized (n= 26)
Dropped out (n= 3)
♦ Health problems (n= 1)
♦ Rescheduling (n= 2)
Completed (n= 23)

Completed but Ineligible due syntax
error (n= 2)
Excluded (n=3)
♦ Technical problem (n= 1)
♦ Did not complete EIT1 and/or 2
(n= 2)

Analysed (n=18)

Participants
Eighteen participants were included in the

analyses. Participants identified their biological sex as well as gender identity; 77.78% (n=14)
identified their biological sex as female, 22.22% (n=4) identified their biological sex as male;
55.55% (n=10) of the sample identified their gender identity as female, 22.22% (n=4) as male,
5.56% (n=1) transgender, 5.56% (n=1) non-binary, and 11.11% (n=2) did not specify their
gender identity. In terms of sexual orientation, 16.67% (n=3) self-identified as bisexual, 11.11%
(N=2) as gay/lesbian, 55.56% (N=10) as heterosexual, 5.56% (N=1) as queer, 5.56% (N=1) as
asexual, and 5.56% (N=1) indicated “Other”. The majority of participants 61.11% (N=11) selfidentified as White, 22.22% (N=4) as Black, 11.11% (N=2) as Latinx/Hispanic (White), 11.11%
(N=2) as Middle Eastern and North African (MENA), 5.56% (N=1) as Asian, 5.56% (N=1) as
Alaskan Native, 1 participant identified as Romani, 1 identified as West Indian/American, and 1
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participant wrote in that “none of these adequately describe me.” I allowed participants to select
as many racial categories as they felt best describe their identity, therefore these numbers are
frequencies of categories. The age range of participant was 18-30 years old with the mean age of
22.33 (SD=3.40).
Measures and Assessment
Prescreening measures. All UMass Boston students were sent an email recruiting them
for part one of the study, which contained a Psychdata link. This link included a consent form for
part one, a demographic questionnaire, the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Skills (DERS),
DASS-21, Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ), Multidimensional Experiential
Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ) (described below), a question asking if they would be
interested in being contacted for another related study, and contact information forms for the
raffle and for future studies. All measures in this link were presented in a fixed order in order to
be consistent across all participants.
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). The Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a 36-item self-report multidimensional
measure. Participants indicate how often each item on the scale applies to them on a regular
basis, using a 5-point Likert scale. Example items include: “When I’m upset, I feel guilty for
feeling that way” and “When I’m upset, I believe that I’ll end up feeling very depressed.” The
DERS is composed of items representing six factors of emotion regulation including: awareness
and understanding of one’s emotions, acceptance of one’s emotional experience, one’s ability to
control impulsive behaviors and continue to engage in goal-congruent behaviors while emotional
distress, and lastly the flexible use of situationally appropriate emotion regulation strategies to
meet individual goals (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The DERS has been shown to have adequate
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predictive and construct validity, and good test-retest reliability (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The
DERS total score was used to predict individual performance on first laboratory task without
emotion regulation instructions. Higher scores indicate more difficulties with regulating
emotional experience. Internal consistency in the current sample was .90.
The Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales (DASS). The Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scales
(DASS-21) (DASS-Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a 21-item measure that assesses three
symptoms over the past week: depression, anxiety, and stress. The scale ranges from: 0 (Did not
apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to me very much, or most of the time). Examples include: “I
found it difficult to relax”, “I found it difficult to work up initiative to do things”, and “I felt I
had nothing to look forward to.” The DASS-21 has been shown to have adequate construct
validity, internal consistency, temporal stability, and strong reliabilities within community and
clinical samples (Henry & Crawford, 2005). In this investigation the anxiety and stress subscales
were inclusion criteria such that individuals currently experiencing elevated levels of anxious
arousal or general anxiety were contacted for the experimental portion. The target population
was individuals who score at or above the moderate range, which is a score at or above a raw
score of 10 on the anxiety subscale and/or those who score at or above a raw score of 19 on the
stress subscale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Internal consistency for the stress subscale was
.70 and the anxiety subscale was. 69.
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ). The Acceptance and Action
Questionnaire (AAQ) (Hayes et al., 2004) is a self-report measure of experiential avoidance.
Participants completed a 22-item version of the AAQ, which can be used to score all validated
versions of the AAQ (single factor 16-item, single factor 9-item, or two-factor 16-item). The 9item version has demonstrated adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha= .70), and test-
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retest reliability (r=.64 in an undergraduate sample over 4 months; Hayes et al., 2004). The 16item single factor version is highly correlated with the 9-item version, but has demonstrated
higher internal consistency and is thought to be more sensitive to change (Hayes et al., 2004),
therefore we used the 16-item version scoring for this study. Participants rated the degree to
which each statement applied to them on a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 is never true and 7 is
always true. The AAQ has been successfully used in other investigations of experiential
avoidance using evocative films and images (Tull, Jakupcak, & Roemer, 2010; Sloan, 2004).
Sample items include: ‘‘I’m not afraid of my feelings’’, ‘‘Anxiety is bad’’, and ‘‘When I
evaluate something negatively, I usually recognize that this is just a reaction not an objective
fact’’ (reverse scored). Higher scores on the AAQ indicate a habitual or frequent use of
experiential avoidance. Scores on this measure were used to predict performance on the first
laboratory task. I predicted that those with higher levels of trait EA would have poorer
performance on the task. Internal consistency in this sample was .68.
Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ). The
Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ) (Gámez et al., 2011) is a
newer 62-item self- report measure of experiential avoidance. Participants rate the extent to
which they agree or disagree with statement on 6-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to
strongly agree. Statements include, “I feel disconnected from my emotions”, “I work hard to
keep out upset feelings”, and “Pain always leads to suffering.” The MEAQ has shown adequate
internal consistency in community, undergraduate, and clinical samples. We included this
addition measure of EA in order to more fully measure and capture the construct of EA. There is
evidence the AAQ only captures nonacceptance of distress and interference with values (Gamez
et al., 2011). Therefore in order to more fully measure experiential avoidance and all its
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multifaceted aspects, such as behavioral avoidance and distraction, we included this additional
measure of EA, and also examined whether it predicted poorer performance on the first
laboratory task. Higher scores on this measure indicate higher levels of experiential avoidance.
Internal consistency in this sample was .95.
Emotional Interference Task and State Measures
Emotion Interference Task (EIT). In the Emotional Interference Task (EIT; Buodo et
al., 2002) participants viewed 40 images: 20 neutral and 20 unpleasant images from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al. 2008), in random order, for 6,000 ms
each. At either 1,000 ms (stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA)), or 4,000 ms after picture is on the
screen, a high- or low-pitched tone was presented. The high tone was set at 2,000 Hz and the low
tone was set at 400 Hz (Ortner et al., 2007). Images selected were based on Ortner’s 2007 and
Buodo’s 2002 studies. I selected images based on mean arousal ratings used by these authors
who utilized the same task. In Buodo’s (2002) investigation the mean arousal for neutral images
was 2.88 and threatening images was 6.91. Ortner and colleagues (2013) did not report the mean
arousal ratings in their study, but I requested the images they used. The mean arousal rating for
their neutral images was 2.74 and mean arousal rating for negative images was 6.32. Therefore, I
adhered as closely as possible to these means. The mean arousal rating for the neutral images I
chose was 2.80 and mean arousal for negative images was 6.53.
Participants completed the task by viewing the images and then responding as quickly as
possible by indicating if the tone they heard was high or low. There was a 1 second interstimulus interval (ISI) between picture presentations, meaning that there was a blank screen for 1
second between images. After the images, there was a three-minute recovery period. During this
time the screen was blank and the auditory tones were presented again using the same
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randomization as during the picture viewing period. Again participants had to indicate if the tone
was low or high as quickly as possible. There was a tone presented at either every 1 ms SOA or
4ms SOA with a 1 ISI in between tones. This three-minute recovery period was a deviation from
methods used in Ortner’s 2013 paper. In order for us to test our hypothesis about recovery
effects, we included a recovery period of this length to be consistent with the literature on
recovery (See Levitt et al., 2004).
Participants completed the EIT twice, once with instructions to simply complete the task
(EIT 1) and a second time with instructions on how to regulate their emotional experience while
conducting the task (EIT 2).
Calculations of EIT. Emotional interference was calculated separately for reaction
time (RT) to tones happening at 1ms SOA and 4ms SOA. This score was calculated by
subtracting the mean RTs to tones at neutral images from the mean RTs to unpleasant images
(Ortner et al., 2007). Emotional interference recovery was determined by calculating the RT to
tones at 1ms SOA and a separate mean for RT to tones at 4ms SOA. Due to a technical error,
tones at 4ms SOA were not presented during the picture presentation period. Therefore I only
utilized EIT score to 1ms SOA for the EIT score. The recovery period did utilize the 4ms SOA,
therefore both 1ms SOA and 4ms SOA recovery scores were utilized.
State Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS). The State Difficulties in
Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS; Lavender et al., 2015) is a 21- item self-report measure of
in the moment difficulties of emotion regulation. It was developed from the DERS (Gratz &
Roemer, 2004). Participants indicate how much each statement applies to their current emotions,
using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (completely). Sample items include:
“I am embarrassed for feeling this way” and “I am having difficulty controlling my behavior.”
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The S-DERS contains four factors of state emotion regulation including: nonacceptance of
current emotions, limited ability to modulate current emotional and behavioral responses, lack of
awareness of current emotions, and lack of clarity about current emotions (Lavender et al.,
2015). The S-DERS total scale has been shown to have good internal consistency (α = .86) and
the Nonacceptance (α= .92), Modulate (α =.85) and Awareness (α =.79) subscales demonstrate
adequate to excellent internal consistency. The Clarity subscale (α =.65) demonstrated marginal
internal consistency, related to the subscale containing only 2 items. Construct validity was
examined using other measures of mindfulness, experiential avoidance, emotional intensity and
reactivity, and with measures of substance use problems. All positively correlated with measure
and in the predicted directions. S-DERS was administered after each EIT in order to investigate
whether state difficulties regulating emotion impact performance. Internal consistency at time
point one (S-DERS1) was .91 and at time point two (S-DER2) was .92.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a 20-item state mood adjective checklist
designed to measure Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA) factors. Participants rate on
a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely) the extent to which they
are currently experiencing the described affective state. For this investigation we only used the
negative affect scale. Sample descriptors from this scale include, “upset”, “jittery”, “distressed”
and “upset.” This measure was used to assess mood before and after EIT1, the mood induction
(i.e., viewing of film) and after EIT2. Internal consistency in this sample measured at the first
time point negative affect was .75. For negative affect assessed at the second time point, the
internal consistency was .84. For negative affect measured at the third and final time point, the
internal consistency was .82.
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Subjective Units of Distress scale (SUDs). The Subjective Units of Distress scale (SUDs)
(Wolpe, 1982) is a self- report measure used to index in the moment anxiety or distress.
Participants indicate on a scale from zero (no anxiety) to 100 (extreme anxiety) their level of
current anxiety. The SUDs was used to measure anxiety before and after both EITs and after the
fear induction film.
Mood Induction. I chose to use a film in an attempt to increase the level of negative
affect, specifically fear, participants experienced before completing the second EIT. Using a film
allows for consistency across participants and does not rely on individuals to recall past
experiences or use imagination. Films clips have been successfully used in previous studies to
elicit emotion in the laboratory (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Sloan, D. 2004; Wolgast et al., 2011).
I used a clip from “The Ring” (Verbinski, 2002) because it has been successfully used to induce
fear in previous laboratory investigations (Wolgast et al., 2011). This is a three minute and
sixteen second clip that depicts a scene in which a family is being haunted by a ghostly figure.
Emotion Regulation Instructions. Instructions for the acceptance condition are taken
from Campbell- Sills et al. (2006). Participants assigned to the acceptance condition were given
instructions encouraging them to experience their emotions as fully as possible and to refrain
from control efforts while completing the EIT. (e.g., ‘‘Struggling against relatively natural
emotions can actually intensify and prolong your distress;’’ ‘‘Allow yourself to accept your
emotions without trying to get rid of them’’; Cambell-Sills et al., 2006). Instructions for the
suppression condition were an adaptation of Cambell-Sills et al. (2006) and Tull et al. (2000).
The suppression instructions instructed participants to control their emotional reactions as much
as possible during the task (e.g., ‘‘it is possible to experience emotions at lower levels if you
really concentrate on controlling them;’’ ‘‘you should not have to put up with more discomfort
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and distress than is necessary’’). If they did experience emotions during viewing of the images,
they were instructed to try their best to push these emotions away so that they did not feel them
(Tull et al., 2000). Full instructions for both these conditions are in Appendix A. Instructions for
the control condition simply told participants to complete the task as previously instructed.
All participants viewed the fear inducing film clip and then completed the EIT once again using
their specified emotion regulation strategy.
Procedures
Participants who were eligible for and interested in the experimental study were
scheduled within 2-4 weeks of completing the pre-screening measures, specifically because the
DASS-21 is an assessment of emotional state within the previous two weeks. Once participants
were contacted and scheduled for their appointment, they were randomly assigned to condition:
acceptance, suppression, or view (control). Randomization was done in a block design in order to
balance conditions on self-reported levels of acceptance (using the AAQ) and was not completed
by the experimenter to keep her blind to the participant levels of acceptance.
Once participants were brought to the lab they completed informed consent. The consent
form included the following brief information about the study, “The study involves examining
the effects of viewing unpleasant pictures on attention and emotion. I have been advised that in
the study, I shall be asked to complete a task on the computer. In this task, I shall be viewing
pictures of unpleasant and neutral scenes and pressing a button as quickly as I can every time I
hear a tone. While viewing the pictures, I may also be asked to think about the picture in a
particular way.” (Ortner et al., 2013). They were asked to silence or turn off their cellular phones
to minimize distraction. They were also informed that they could stop their participation at any
time.
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Participants were told to keep their focus on the computer screen because images would
begin to appear on the screen that they must attend to (Buodo et al., 2002; Ortner et al., 2007;
Ortner et al., 2013). They were informed that the first portion was a practice trial with four
images, where periodically they heard either a high or low pitch auditory tone. They responded
to this tone as quickly as possible by pressing button #1 if the tone was high pitch and button #2
if the tone was low pitch. Participants placed headphones on and completed the practice trial.
Once the practice trial was over, the experimenter informed participants to keep headphones on
and keep eyes on the screen even when images don’t appear, and keep responding to the tones,
until the experimenter informs them otherwise. Then the experimenter informed participants that
for the remainder of the study they would be in the adjacent room communicating with them via
an intercom. This was done to minimize demand effects.
First participants were instructed to complete a PANAS and SUDS questionnaires. Then
they completed the EIT1. Once EIT1 was complete (including the three minute recovery period),
the experimenter used the intercom to instruct participants to complete a second PANAS, second
SUDS, and the first S-DERS. Participants used the intercom to inform the researcher when they
completed the questionnaires. The experimenter then informed participants they would be
listening to instructions on how to approach the following video and EIT2. Participants read
along while listening to manipulation instructions. After the instructions, participants watched
the film clip, rated their current their current level of distress using the SUDS (third SUDS), and
then completed the final EIT. Once EIT2 was complete participants again complete a third
PANAS, fourth SUDS, second S-DERS, and a manipulation check (described below) on paper.
Lastly, they viewed an uplifting clip from the Chocolate Factory episode of “I love Lucy” and
then debriefed about the study.
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Manipulation Check. The manipulation check was adapted from Campbell-Sills et al.
(2006b). It included a true/false questionnaire that tests participants’ understanding of the
instructions that were presented (e.g., ‘‘During the task, I should try to suppress my emotions as
much as possible;’’ the correct answer was ‘‘true’’ for the suppression group and ‘‘false’’ for the
acceptance group). Also participants were asked, “‘How able were you to follow the instructions
during the task?’’ Participants rated their ability to follow the instructions on a 0–8 scale (0 not at
all able to, 8 completely able).
Behavioral Assessment. Once the task was done participants were asked how willing
they are in viewing another set of images on a 5-point scale (0 – 4) scale, where 0 is not willing
at all and 4 is willing (Levitt et al., 2004). This was a measure of behavioral engagement or
avoidance.
Restated Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a predicted that the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz
& Roemer, 2004) would be positively related to ability to disengage and recover from an
emotionally arousing task as measured by reaction time in the Emotion Interference Task (EIT1;
Buodo et al., 2002) and recovery from task. It was also hypothesized in hypothesis 2b that the
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004) and the Multidimensional
Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire (MEAQ; Gámez et al., 2011) would be positively
associated with ability to disengage and recover from an emotionally arousing task again using
EIT1 and EIT recovery (Buodo et al., 2002). Hypothesis 3c predicted that the State Difficulties
in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS; Lavender et al., 2015) would be positively related to
ability to disengage and recover from an emotionally arousing task as measured by reaction time
in the EIT1 and recovery from task EIT1.
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Hypothesis 2a states that those instructed to use acceptance strategies would more
quickly disengage and recover from an emotionally arousing task (EIT2) compared to those
using suppression or no strategy. Hypothesis 2b predicted that those instructed to use acceptance
would report lower levels of negative affect from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Hypothesis 2c predicted that those instructed to use
acceptance would be more willing to view another set of images in the task.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Tests of normality were conducted on all primary study variables. Several EIT variables
were significantly skewed. The recovery score from the EIT1 at 4ms SOA was skewed, therefore
a log transformation was used to transform the variable. Scores of the EIT2 at 1ms SOA
contained an outlier, therefore I used a winsorization transformation in order to retain the
variable while mitigating the impact of the outlier. EIT2 recovery at 1ms SOA was also skewed
and was normalized using a square root transformation. The second assessment of negative affect
(PANAS_NA2) and the state emotion regulation difficulties (S-DERS) measure at both time
points during the experimental portion of the study were not normally distributed. Logarithmic
transformation was used to normalize the measure of negative affect. The two measures of state
emotion regulation (S-DERS) were significantly positively skewed. Therefore the first S-DERS
was transformed by using the reciprocal values, and the second S-DERS was transformed using a
logarithmic transformation. The second manipulation check variable was significantly negatively
skewed, therefore the variable was reflected, a logarithmic transformation was used, and the
variable was reflected back to its original direction. Unfortunately, the manipulation check
variable, which consisted of one question, was still slightly skewed, but I decided to use the
closest to normal variable possible. The behavioral assessment variable was also significantly
skewed and had limited range of values, therefore I transformed it into a dichotomous variable.
The scale ranged from 0 (not willing) to 4 (willing). Low willingness to view another set of
images was captured by those who indicated a 3 or lower and high willingness were those who
indicates a 4 on the behavioral assessment of willingness. All other study variables were
normally distributed.
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Again this investigation was a pilot study, therefore the analyses were all underpowered
and exploratory in nature. Since this study was underpowered, I will examine and interpret effect
sizes rather than solely report and analyze significance levels.
Equivalence of Conditions on Key Variables
To ensure that condition assignments were balanced on trait levels of acceptance, an
ANOVA was conducted to examine trait acceptance (AAQ) across conditions. There were no
significant differences of trait acceptance based on condition, F(2,15)= 1.00, p=.39, ηp2= .12.
The partial eta square value of .12 was a medium to large effect size, indicating that the
magnitude of this relationship is strong and potentially significant with more power. Those in the
suppression group reported higher levels of experiential avoidance (AAQ) and conversely lower
levels of trait acceptance than those in the other two conditions. See Table 1. This is a potential
confound in the results and indication that the groups were not balanced across this trait.
Separate ANOVAs determined that conditions were statistically equivalent across other
relevant traits and measures of stress and anxiety. There was no statistically significant
difference between condition on trait acceptance (MEAQ), F(2,15)= .35, p=.71, ηp2=.04 and
difficulty with emotion regulation (DERS), F(2,15)= .46, p=.64, ηp2=.06. The conditions also did
not differ significantly based on baseline level of anxiety, (DASS_Anxiety), F(2, 15)=2.73,
p=.10, ηp2=. 27, and did not differ in baseline levels of stress (DASS_stress), F(2,15)= .70,
p=.51, ηp2=. 09. However, anxious arousal assessed with DASS_anxiety had a large effect size
(ηp2=. 27), with those in the suppression group reporting higher levels of anxious arousal than
those in the acceptance and control conditions. See Table 1. This is another potential indication
that those in the suppression group may be systematically different than the other two groups.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Untransformed Variables of Interest
Variable

Acceptance

Suppression

Control

AAQ

64.83 (8.13)

72.17 (13.20)

64.67 (9.27)

DASS_Anx

17.33 (9.09)

24.33 (8.24)

14.33 (4.80)

DASS_Stress

23.00 (7.24)

23.33 (8.82)

18.67 (6.65)

DERS

103.33 (17.13)

91.50 (24.82)

101.77 (26.77)

MEAQ

201.06 (66.11)

192.93 (52.63)

217.50 (32.25)

Note. AAQ= Anxiety and Action Questionnaire, DASS-A = Depression Anxiety and Stress
Scale-Anxious Arousal Subscale; DASS-S = Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale- General
Anxiety Subscale; MEAQ= Multidimensional Experiential Avoidance Questionnaire; DERS=
Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale
Manipulation Check
In order to ensure that participants followed the emotion regulation instructions they were
given, I asked them to answer two questions to assess their understanding of the instructions.
These questions were answered after they completed EIT2. Participants were asked to respond to
a true/false question asking, ‘‘During the task, I should try to suppress my emotions as much as
possible;’’ the correct answer was ‘‘true’’ for the suppression group and ‘‘false’’ for the
acceptance group. 100% of those in the acceptance condition responded correctly by indicating
“false.” In both the suppression and control conditions one participant in each group answered
incorrectly.
Also participants were asked, “‘How able were you to follow the instructions during the
task?’’, and rated their ability to follow the instructions on a 0–8 scale (0 not at all able to, 8
completely able). There was no statistically significant difference between the acceptance
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(untransformed M=6.00, SD=2.61) and suppression (untransformed M=5.33, SD=1.75)
conditions, t(10)= -.81, p=.45.
Finally, there was no significant difference in self-reported levels of distress before
(M=26.44, SD= 20.28) and after the film (mood induction) (M=32.22, SD=25.38), t(17)= -0.81,
p=.43. This suggests that the fear induction was not successful in inducing significant levels of
distress in this sample.
Correlational Results
The first set of hypotheses focus on the relationship between both trait and state emotion
regulation ability and acceptance, and participants’ ability to disengage their attention from
unpleasant stimuli and recovery (performance on EIT1 and recovery from EIT1). To examine
these hypotheses, correlations between the self-reported trait variables DERS, AAQ, MEAQ and
outcomes variables, EIT1and EIT1 recovery were conducted. See Table 2.
Table 2
Zero Order Correlations AAQ, MEAQ, DERS, EIT1
Variable

EIT1_1ms

EITrecovery1ms

EITrecovery4ms

DERS

.17

-.32

-.36

AAQ

-.00

-.46

-.42

MEAQ

-.07

-.06

-.05

Note. No values were significantly correlated. EIT1ms_soa= Emotional Interference task 1_1
second stimulus onset asynchrony; EIT1recovery1ms soa=Emotional Interference task 1
recovery_1second stimulus onset asynchrony; EIT1recovery4ms soa=Emotional Interference
task 1 recovery_4ms stimulus onset asynchrony; DERS= Difficulties with Emotion Regulation
Scale; AAQ= Anxiety and Action Questionnaire; MEAQ= Multidimensional Experiential
Avoidance Questionnaire
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In addition, partial correlations were conducted of these trait variables and EIT variables,
while controlling for baseline PANAS negative affect scores. See Table 3.
Table 3
Correlations Controlling for Baseline Negative Affect
Variable

EIT1_1ms

EITrecovery1ms

EITrecovery4ms

DERS

.16

-.25

-.31

AAQ

-.02

-.42

-.38

MEAQ

-.08

-.02

-.02

Note. No values were significantly correlated. EIT1ms_soa= Emotional Interference task 1_1
second stimulus onset asynchrony; EIT1recovery1ms soa=Emotional Interference task 1
recovery_1second stimulus onset asynchrony; EIT1recovery4ms soa=Emotional Interference
task 1 recovery_4ms stimulus onset asynchrony; DERS= Difficulties with Emotion Regulation
Scale; AAQ= Anxiety and Action Questionnaire; MEAQ= Multidimensional Experiential
Avoidance Questionnaire
The first study hypothesis predicted that emotion regulation abilities would be positively
related to ability to disengage and recover from the first EIT while controlling for baseline
negative affect (in other words, DERS would be positively related to longer reaction times,
because longer reaction times indicate inhibited responding to neutral tones). Partial correlations
revealed no statistically significant correlation between EIT1 interference score and trait emotion
regulation difficulties (DERS), r(14)= .16, n.s. See Table 3 for means and standard deviations.
Correlations between recovery scores and difficulties with emotion regulation revealed a
negative relationship, with a small to medium effect size, with a correlation of r(14)= -.25 with
EIT1 recovery at 1ms, and r(14)= -.31 with EIT1 recovery at 4ms. This non-significant, medium
sized negative relation is not in the predicted direction and does not support the first study
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hypothesis. Surprisingly these results indicate that participants with more difficulties regulating
their emotions actually responded to tones nonsignificantly more quickly.
The hypothesis also predicted that trait levels of experiential avoidance would be
positively related to ability to disengage and recover from EIT1 after controlling for baseline
negative affect (i.e., that higher AAQ scores (higher EA) would be positively correlated with
longer reaction times). Partial correlations controlling for negative affect revealed no statistically
significant correlation between EIT1 interference score and trait levels of experiential avoidance
(AAQ), r(14)= -.02. See Table 3 for means and standard deviations. Correlations between
recovery scores and trait experiential avoidance revealed a negative relationship, with a medium
effect size, with correlational of r(14)= -.42 with EIT1 recovery at 1ms, and r(14)= -.38 with
EIT1 recovery at 4ms. This nonsignificant, medium sized negative relation is also not in the
predicted direction and does not support the first study hypothesis. This result indicates that
participants with more habitual use of experiential avoidance were able to respond to tones nonsignificantly more quickly.
Next correlations between state emotion regulation ability and attentional disengagement
and recovery were conducted to see if concurrent emotion regulation was associated with these
outcomes. See table 4 for correlations between S-DERS and EIT 1 and recovery from EIT 1.
Table 4
Zero Order Correlations DERS and EIT1
Variable
S-DER1

EIT1_1ms
-.20

EITrecovery1ms
.27

EITrecovery4ms
.10

Note. No values were significantly correlated. EIT1ms_soa= Emotional Interference task 1_1
second stimulus onset asynchrony; EIT1recovery1ms soa=Emotional Interference task 1
recovery_1second stimulus onset asynchrony; EIT1recovery4ms soa=Emotional Interference
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task 1 recovery_4ms stimulus onset asynchrony; S-DERS1= State Difficulties with Emotion
Regulation
In addition partial correlations were conducted between S-DERS, while controlling for
baseline negative affect (PANAS_NA) scores. See table 5.
Table 5
Correlations Controlling for Baseline Negative Affect
Variable

EIT1_1ms

S-DER1

-.19

EITrecovery1ms
.00

EITrecovery4ms
-.20

Note. No values were significantly correlated. EIT1ms_soa= Emotional Interference task 1_1
second stimulus onset asynchrony; EIT1recovery1ms soa=Emotional Interference task 1
recovery_1second stimulus onset asynchrony; EIT1recovery4ms soa=Emotional Interference
task 1 recovery_4ms stimulus onset asynchrony; S-DERS1= State Difficulties with Emotion
Regulation
State difficulties with emotion regulation (i.e., in the moment ability to regulate one’s
emotional experience) and EIT1 1ms score were nonsignificantly negatively correlated, with a
small to medium effect sizes r(14)= -.19, n.s. These findings also do not support the study
hypothesis, with a nonsignificant association in the opposite direction of predictions. State
difficulties with emotion regulation and EIT1 recovery at 1ms had no relation, r(14)= .00, n.s.
and EIT1 recovery at 4ms were nonsignificantly negatively correlated, r(14)= -.20, n.s. The
negative relation between recovery and S-DERS is also contrary to study prediction and indicate
that those with more difficulty regulating their emotions in the moment were able to respond to
the tones more quickly. In conclusion, the first hypothesis was not supported.
Experimental Results
Next the effects of the emotion regulation instructions (acceptance, suppression, and no
instructions) on attentional disengagement, recovery, and negative affect were examined.
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Separate ANCOVAs were conducted to compare the ways in which acceptance, suppression and
control manipulations influenced emotion interference during task 2 (EIT 2), and emotional
interference during the recovery period of task 2 (EIT2 recovery), while controlling for
performance on EIT1 and recovery from EIT1 respectively. Post-hoc analyses examined which
groups significantly differed on these outcomes. In addition, an ANCOVA was conducted to
examine the condition effects on negative affect scores (PANAS) after the recovery period of
EIT2, controlling for PANAS negative affect scores after the film.
I predicted that those instructed to use acceptance strategies would better disengage (i.e.,
have quicker response times), and recover from the negative images compared to those using
suppression or no strategy. A one- way ANCOVA was conducted to determine differences
between conditions on attentional disengagement from negative images, while controlling for
performance on the task prior to the manipulation. There was no statistically significant main
effect of condition, although effect size was large, F(2, 12)= 2.52, p=.12, ηp2= .30.
Table 6
Mean of EIT2 at 1ms SOA
Variable

Unadjusted Mean (SD)

Adjusted Mean (SE)

Acceptance

24.50 (107.35)

49.65 (31.42)

Suppression

-35.72 (97.16)

-27.19 (29.38)

Control

48.63 (19.56)

50.31 (29.45)

Note. EIT2 1ms SOA= Emotional Interference task 2 at 1 second stimulus onset asynchrony
The means indicate that participants using suppression (M=-27.18, SE= 29.38) were able
to more quickly disengage their attention from threat images than those using acceptance
(M=49.65, SE= 31.42) and the control group (M=50.31, SE=29.45) suggesting this strategy may
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be more beneficial in the short-term. In fact, those in the suppression condition responded more
quickly to threat versus neutral images. See Table 6. The large effect size indicates that the
relationship between condition and attentional disengagement from fearful images, although not
statistically significant, may be meaningful and likely to be significant with a larger sample size
Then two one-way ANCOVAs were conducted to determine differences between
acceptance, suppression, and control on response times to tones during the recovery period from
emotional interference task (EIT2), while controlling for response times during the recovery
period from EIT1. The first ANCOVA for recovery from EIT2 of tones at 1ms revealed a
nonsignificant, but large main effect of condition, F(2,12)= 3.15, p=.08, ηp2= .35. Those utilizing
acceptance (M=676.26, SE=61.59) responded to tones during the recovery period more quickly
than those using suppression (M=722.62, SE=61.83) and those in the control group (M=698.74,
SE=56.72), relative to their performance prior to the manipulation (i.e., adjusting for their scores
during the first EIT). See Table 7 and Figure 1. These nonsignificant trending findings do
support the study hypothesis.
Table 7
Mean of Recovery at EIT2 at 1ms SOA
Variable

Unadjusted Mean (SD)

Adjusted Mean (SE)

Acceptance

782.03 (297.24)

676.26 (61.59)

Suppression

614.15 (74.10)

722.62 (61.83)

Control

701.44 (187.04)

698.74 (56.72)

Note. EIT2 1ms SOA= Emotional Interference task 2 at 1 second stimulus onset asynchrony

42

Figure 1
Unadjusted Means of Reaction Time During Recovery of EIT1 and EIT2 at 1ms SOA
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The second ANCOVA investigated recovery of EIT2 and RT to auditory tones at 4ms. The main
effect of condition was nonsignificant, but medium to large in effect size, F(2,12)=.70, p=.52,
ηp2=.10. Those utilizing acceptance (M=691.60, SE=53.10) were quicker to respond to tones
during the recovery period than those in the suppression (M=719.14.58, SE= 86.69) and control
conditions (M=695.16, SE=48.99), relative to their performance prior to the manipulation (i.e.,
adjusting for their scores during the first EIT. See Table 8 and Figure 2. These nonsignificant,
but large effect size findings do support the study hypotheses about the influence acceptance
would have on attentional disengagement. These findings indicate that acceptance may actually
allow individuals to recover from negative stimuli more rapidly, and/or that, conversely,
suppression may slow recovery from negative stimuli.
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Table 8
Means of Recovery at EIT2 at 4ms SOA
Variable

Unadjusted Mean (SD)

Adjusted Mean (SE)

Acceptance

775.50 (254.64)

691.60 (53.10)

Suppression

679.58 (102.76)

719.14 (86.69)

Control

714.92 (237.18)

695.16 (48.99)

Note. EIT2 1ms SOA= Emotional Interference task 2 at 4 second stimulus onset asynchrony
Figure 2
Unadjusted means of reaction time during recovery of EIT1 and EIT2 at 4ms SOA
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In order to more closely examine the change across tasks, I looked at the mean reaction
time during recovery of first and second EIT across groups. These means and standard deviation
are reported in Table 9. Those in the suppression group were quickest to recover in the first task
(without manipulation). This will be discussed further below.
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Table 9
Mean and Standard Deviations of EIT1 recovery during 1ms and 4 ms SOA
Variable

EIT1 1msSOA

EIT 1 4msSOA

Acceptance

826.69 (132.07)

766.44 (201.62)

Suppression

599.10 (61.47)

602.30 (56.03)

Control

717.20 (251.63)

740.25 (269.93)

Note. EIT11ms SOA= Emotional Interference task 1 at 1 second stimulus onset asynchrony;
EIT1 4ms SOA= Emotional Interference task 1 at 4 second stimulus onset asynchrony
A final ANCOVA was conducted to determine condition effects of negative affect after
the EIT2, while controlling negative affect after the EIT1. The ANCOVA main effect of
condition revealed was non-significant, with a medium effect size, F(2,11)=.42, p=.67, ηp2=.07.
Although conditions did not differ in negative affect, those in the suppression group (M=13.90,
SE=1.40) reported lower levels of negative affect than those in the acceptance (M=17.34,
SE=1.58) and control groups (M=15.11, SE=1.80). See Table 10. These nonsignificant, medium
effect size findings do not support the study hypothesis.
Table 10
Means of negative affect
Variable

Unadjusted Mean (SD)

Adjusted Mean (SE)

Acceptance

16.20 (3.55)

17.34 (1.58)

Suppression

13.67 (3.93)

13.90 (1.40)

Control

17.40 (5.59)

15.11 (1.80)

A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between
willingness to view another set of images and emotion regulation instructions used by
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participants. The relation between these variables was significant, X2 (2, N = 18) = 8.55, p=.01.
All participants (i.e. 100%) in the suppression group had high willingness (indicated a 4 on the
behavioral assessment measure) to view another set of images. Half of the participants in
acceptance condition indicated high willingness. Those in the control condition were mostly in
the low willingness category with 62.5% indicating low willingness to view another set of
images.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
This study hoped to elucidate the ways in which acceptance, a proposed mechanism of
change in ABBTs (Hayes, S.A et al., 2010; Arch & Craske, 2008; Arch et al., 2012a; Twohig et
al., 2010; Niles et al., 2014), helps make clinically meaningful change for individuals who are
experiencing elevated levels of anxious arousal and generalized anxiety. Research suggests that
anxiety is maintained and exacerbated through prolonged engagement with threatening
information (Constans, 2005; Elzinga & Bemmer, 2002) and that the ability to flexibly shift
attention in arousing situations can help alleviate distress (Bardeen & Orcutt, 2011; Bardeen &
Read, 2010). Therefore I investigated how emotion regulation strategies, acceptance and
suppression, impact attention and potentially increase attentional flexibility. Specifically, I
examined whether acceptance could help individuals experiencing moderate to high levels of
anxiety disengage their attention from negative images, recover from this distress, mitigate
negative affect, and increase behavioral willingness. These negative images were part of a dual
task paradigm (i.e., the emotional interference task), which measured the time individuals took to
respond to the distractor stimuli (i.e., auditory tone) while viewing negative images. Reaction
time to auditory tones was a proxy measure for attentional disengagement and flexibility. To
assess recovery, participants responded to the distractor stimuli while looking at a blank screen
(not viewing negative images); recovery was calculated using reaction time to tones.
In order to investigate these relations, I conducted both correlational and experimental
analyses. For the correlational analyses I investigated the relations between dimensional selfratings of trait and state emotion regulation ability, trait acceptance, disengagement from viewing
distressing images, and recovery from distress. For the experimental analyses, I investigated
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which emotion regulation strategy- acceptance or suppression- would allow individuals to
disengage and recover from the negative images more quickly, controlling for performance prior
to the manipulation. I also investigated which emotion regulation strategy would lead to lower
levels of self-reported negative affect and higher willingness to view more distressing images.
Correlational hypotheses were not supported and results indicated that there was no
significant relation between attentional disengagement from negative images (EIT1), and trait
experiential avoidance, trait difficulty with emotion regulation, and state difficulties with
emotions regulation. Therefore the hypotheses that fewer difficulties with emotion regulation and
higher levels of trait acceptance (lower levels of EA) would facilitate quicker disengagement and
recovery on the task were not supported. There may be moderating factors that could have more
specifically impacted this relation that were not assessed in this study. Since this was a
heterogeneous sample of anxious and stressed individuals, the images presented in the task may
have been too varied to truly impact attention, especially in such a small sample. There also may
be a more nuanced relation between these trait characteristics and attention that research needs to
further elucidate. Also, the small sample size of the experimental portion of this study is a major
limitation to this investigation. The lack of power to find effects in the correlational findings
indicates need for larger sample. Once all limitations of the study are further discussed in later
sections, implications of these findings will be discussed.
When assessing whether these characteristics would predict recovery from the task, there
were nonsignificant, but medium to large negative relations, such that those with higher levels of
experiential avoidance (lower levels of acceptance) and more difficulty with emotion regulation
were able to respond to tones more quickly during recovery. Although these findings were not
statistically significant, this may suggest that individuals’ who more habitually use suppression
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towards distress may have had more intact attention allowing them to recover from exposure to
threat more quickly. This also may suggest that when individuals habitually utilize suppression,
it is less likely to impact their attention during a brief, time limited task. Also difficulty with
regulating one’s emotion in the moment (state) was not related to disengagement from negative
images and recovery. The trait findings are quite surprising, and with a larger sample findings
could indicate that dysregulation is correlated with no difficulty performing this attentional task
and quicker recovery from the task. On the other hand a larger sample could also weaken this
relation and indicate that there is no relation between these trait factors and performance in this
attentional task and recovery from the task. These findings indicate that more research is needed
to understand how these trait characteristics impact attentional disengagement and the ability to
recover.
Experimental hypotheses predicted that those instructed to use acceptance during the task
would more quickly disengage their attention and recover from distress. Results revealed that
that there was no statistically significant difference between groups (acceptance, suppression,
control) on disengagement from images and the ability to recover from the task. Therefore, the
emotion regulation strategy that participants were assigned to use did not significantly impact
their ability to respond to auditory tones while viewing negative images and recover from
distressing images.
There was a medium to large effect size findings that may be telling with a larger sample.
Those in the suppression group were able to disengage their attention from negative images more
quickly than those in the other two conditions. Recovery from task (response time to tones
without images) indicated an interesting relation. Those in the acceptance condition were
quickest to recover from the task after controlling for recovery from the first task (EIT1).
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Interestingly, when not controlling for recovery from EIT1, those in the suppression group
actually were quicker to recover from this task. When comparing means in EIT1 those in the
suppression group indeed had quicker recovery, but after the instructions were followed and
recovery from EIT1 was controlled for, those using acceptance more quickly recovered during
EIT2. This potentially indicates that acceptance in the moment may help with quicker attentional
recovery after viewing threatening images Conversely, explicit instructions to use suppression
actually slowed participant response time during recovery and therefore slowed their recovery, It
is important to highlight that there are several baseline difference between groups, therefore
these findings may be due to differences between the groups rather than the independent variable
(emotion regulation instructions). No firm conclusions can be made because of these differences
and further implications will be explored in a later section.
Results in the correlational analyses suggest that those who habitually use experiential
avoidance may be more able to more quickly disengage from negative images and recover more
quickly. However, the experimental findings offer some indication that utilizing acceptance
might lead to faster reaction times after the EIT or that using suppression might slow reaction
times during the recovery period, although participants in the suppression condition reported
nonsignificantly less negative affect at the end of the study. Lastly, everyone in the suppression
group, while only half of those in the acceptance group, were highly willing to view another set
of images; more than half of those in the control group were in the low willingness group. The
implication of these findings will be discussed further below.
Limitations
Before further interpretation of these findings and their implications, it is important to
acknowledge limitations of the study. First, this was a pilot study, therefore the sample size was
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small and all interpretations are of effect sizes since none of the results were statistically
significant. Therefore these results and interpretations are preliminary, because findings may or
may not hold up in a larger sample. Also, conditions were not balanced on certain key
characteristics. Participants in the suppression group had higher levels of experiential avoidance
or lower levels of acceptance. Participants in the suppression condition also had higher levels of
anxious arousal (DASS_anx) than those in the acceptance and control groups. These differences
indicate that individuals in the suppression group were characteristically different than the
acceptance and control groups. These potential confounds need to be carefully taken into
consideration when interpreting the results which will be further discussed below.
Also participants did not report a significant difference in levels of distress after the film.
This suggests that the film was not successful in inducing significant levels of distress in this
sample. It is possible that participants did not experience the film as distressing because they
may have already seen the film. Also, individuals are exposed to events in their daily lives (e.g.,
death, news exposure, trauma, discrimination, assault) that are more distressing than a film
which is fantasy. I conducted post-hoc exploratory analyses of distress before and after the first
EIT. There was a significant increase in distress from before the first EIT (M= 23.88, SD=24.56)
and after the completion of EIT1 (M=36.09, SD=19.18), t(10)= -.60, p<.00, indicating that the
images in the task were distressing. Therefore distress did increase but not because of the film;
instead the task itself may have elevated distress. Again I looked at the trajectory of distress by
comparing distress after the film (M=32.22, SD=25.37) and distress at the end of EIT2
(M=31.50, SD=22.35) and they did not significantly differ, t(17)= .17, p=.87. Importantly, the
mean peak distress in this sample was in the 30s (on a 0-100 scale) indicating some distress, but
potentially not enough to be analogous to real life distress. This is a limitation of conducting
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experimental studies where participants are placed in an artificial setting and asked to call upon
emotions that happen in very different contexts.
Lastly, both the suppression and control groups had one participant in each group who
answered the manipulation check question incorrectly, suggesting that they did not follow the
appropriate emotion regulation instructions. Considering the very small sample size, one
participant that did not follow the instructions correctly may have had an impact on the results.
With this information, I reanalyzed the data without these two participants and findings remained
the same, indicating that this may not have impacted results.
Interpretation and Implications of Findings
Correlational Interpretation and Implications
Although none of the correlational findings were statistically significant, it is important to
note that individuals with higher levels of trait experiential avoidance and more difficulties
regulating their emotions demonstrated medium effect size negative relations with recovery from
the first task. This suggests that these participants may have been able to more quickly respond
to auditory tones during recovery period even though they reported more avoidance and
dysregulation in general. These findings are surprising because literature suggests that efforts to
suppress internal experiences, although they can alleviates distress in the short term, have
paradoxical rebound effects in the longer term by actually increasing the severity and frequency
of these internal experiences (Hayes, et al 2006; Wegner et al 1987; Abramowitz, Tolin & Street,
2001). The habitual use of suppression theoretically should have increased reaction time during
the task and led to longer recovery periods. One important consideration is that the recovery
period was actually very close in time to the task therefore this may not capture an actual “long
term” rebound effect. These findings could have exemplified the short-term benefits of
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suppression when directed at a specific, time limited task. On the other hand, participants’
habitual use of this strategy muddies this interpretation. The finding that dysregulation is
nonsignificantly related to quicker attentional disengagement and recovery is still puzzling and
needs to be further investigated with a larger sample size.
Experimental Interpretation and Implications
Again, although not statistically significant, the experimental results suggest that
suppression could have facilitated disengagement from viewing negative stimuli and lower levels
of negative affect at the end of the study if a larger sample were used. Suppression therefore
could have facilitated flexible attention during the task, but it is not clear through what
mechanism this happened. It is also possible that with a larger sample these effects may weaken
so that the potential relation is no longer supported. Also, it is important to remember that those
in the suppression group had higher levels of anxious arousal, therefore this short-term benefit of
suppression while anxious could have helped their performance and elicited short term benefits.
Since both acceptance and suppression utilize cognitive demands, there is little prior evidence to
suggest that either strategy would have led to faster disengagement while viewing negative
images.
On the other hand, the results from the recovery period suggest that acceptance could
have facilitated quicker recovery from task after controlling for performance on EIT1. This
finding is complicated by the fact that before controlling for performance on EIT1, those in the
suppression group had quicker recovery reaction times. Exploratory analyses revealed that those
in the suppression group were actually faster to recover during the first EIT before using any
emotion regulation instructions. Therefore suppression may have actually slowed performances
or hampered attention during recovery in EIT2 or acceptance may have sped up performance
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from EIT1.. In a study examining the use of emotional suppression and acceptance in a sample of
depressed individuals, results indicated that although the acceptance group experienced more
sadness in response to a sad film clip, their level of sadness decreased more steeply in the
recovery period (Liverant et al., 2008), which is consistent with our results. Similarly, Ortner,
Zelazo, and Anderson (2013) investigated the effects of reappraisal and suppression on attention
using the EIT. During their post-picture presentation period, analogous to this study’s recovery
period, results revealed no effect of condition, but exploratory analyses revealed that participants
using suppression in response to unpleasant images were significantly slower to respond to the
distractor stimulus. This evidence and this investigation’s results points to the way in which
acceptance may have residual effects that do not appear in the height of distress, or suppression
may have residual negative effects. Acceptance may facilitate a quicker path to recovery from a
heightened state of arousal, or suppression may interrupt recovery. Recovery measured here is in
the form of quicker or more attentional engagement or flexibility. When looking closely at the
mean reaction times of those in the acceptance condition, the quicker recovery may indicate that
acceptance can help individuals more quickly regain attentional control. Although these
differences are not statistically significant, it would be interesting to see if with a larger sample
size these differences emerge as significant. Alternatively, the baseline group differences of
experiential avoidance, anxious arousal, and negative affect may be impacting these findings,
therefore it is hard to make any conclusions about the emotion regulation strategies impact on
attention.
Interestingly, everyone in the suppression group, while only half of those in the
acceptance group were highly willing to view another set of images. Considering that those in
the suppression group nonsignificantly reported less negative affect after the tasks, they may
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have found the task less aversive than those in the acceptance group, thereby increasing their
willingness. Those experiencing more negative affect would be less willing to engage in a task
arousing negative affect. This is in contrast to two other studies which found that individuals in
the acceptance groups were significantly more willing to engage in a second CO2 challenge than
other groups (Levitt et al., 2004) and more willing to participate in another distressing task (Tull
et al., 2010). Although these studies indicate contrasting findings, an important consideration is
that the film did not increase levels of distress in the sample, yet the first task did. Also, the level
of distress indicated some distress, but was not analogous to real life situations that these
participants may endure on a day-to-day basis. Participant distress did not significantly change
after the movie and EIT2, therefore willingness towards something that did increase distress is
not exactly being captured here. This is one limitation of conducting laboratory based
experimental studies; external validity is limited.
Another very important implication about this study is that the task itself may not be
tapping into attention, disengagement, or flexibility in ways that are generalizable to other
circumstance and more importantly to clinical circumstances. Assessing reaction times to
distractor tones was used as a proxy measure for disengagement, but these preliminary findings
may call into question the validity or usefulness of this task in assessing attention. Also the
images, film, and complete task may not have taxed cognitive demands/load as expected.
I utilized this task in an attempt to capture a clinical phenomena where individuals with
elevated anxiety attend to more threatening stimuli in their environment, and the prolonged
engagement with threat or negative images maintains anxiety symptoms. Also there is evidence
that flexibility in attention can help alleviate some of this distress and anxiety. Therefore the
task’s intended effect was to assess the ways in which different emotion regulation strategies
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impact attentional disengagement and flexibility. Responding to distractor tones may not have
captured flexibility in attention as expected for several reasons. Although the first task was
distressing, the mood induction (i.e., film) did not induce fear or more distress as anticipated,
therefore participants’ attention to threat may not have been as engaged in the first place. Also, it
is possible that a distractor stimulus that was visual and not auditory could have better assessed a
shift in attention. The task may have also been an assessment of how quickly participants were
able to do two non-arousing tasks. When thinking about clinical applications of attentional
flexibility, the stimuli individuals usually encounter are more dynamic. The negative stimuli they
stay in contact with may be contextual or specific to their own idiosyncratic anxieties and fears.
It is important to point out that the generalizability of this task is limited to visual images, not
any real life events, specific phobias, or human feedback or interaction.
Another important consideration is to critically examine how the recovery period was
measured in this task, because it may not have accurately assessed the ability to recover as
intended. Since the film and second task may not have been as emotionally arousing as
anticipated, participants may not have had any arousal to recover from. Therefore if participants
were not distressed, there was no opportunity to truly assess recovery. The recovery period may
merely have been an assessment of how quickly the sample could respond to the tones. Future
studies could consider altering the recovery period by having participants respond to tones while
looking at neutral images rather than a blank screen. The use of a blank screen may not have
engaged their visual attention or even induced boredom, therefore recovery of one’s attention
may not have been engaged. Another idea is for future studies to use tools such as eye tracking
that could more precisely measure visual attention. Another consideration is assessing the ability
to recover via other means, such as physiology.
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Overall this pilot investigation helps us think more deeply and thoroughly about how
emotion regulation impacts attention, and the ways that attention and disengagement can be
measured and operationalized. Future investigations should assess attention through different
measures such as eye tracking, using more arousing or dynamic tasks, and ecological momentary
assessment. Another consideration would be to assess recovery after several hours or days;
conducting more long-term follow up for recovery could help us understand the longer term
consequences of acceptance. Future research could also investigate how individuals are able to
engage in daily activities or tasks that are personally meaningful while distressed, as a way of
capturing another component of attention and acceptance. Also, the use of psychophysiology
could be helpful in understanding recovery from distress, in particular if we want to know how
emotion regulation helps individuals manage physiological arousal and recover from this. It is
also important to consider moderating factors that could impact the outcomes measured here. For
example, suppression may be useful for short periods of time and when individuals are
experiencing certain levels of anxious arousal or general anxiety. Another consideration is that
future research should consider the type of distressing stimuli being presented to participants in
order to ensure an elevation of negative affect or distress.
Given the amount of research in the area of clinical trials of acceptance- based
therapeutic approaches, examining the mechanisms by which these therapies make change is a
critical next step. This investigation was an attempt to break down the ways in which acceptance
can facilitate change. Importantly, this study helps us understand that this emotion regulation
strategy cannot be solely measured via momentary symptom reduction, but it may have
alternative impacts on attention and attentional recovery that help individuals engage in activities
while feeling distress. The clinical implications of these findings are at this point tenuous. There
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is need for a larger sample and more research to better understand how using acceptance impacts
the ability to help individuals experiencing anxious arousal and stress to recover their attention
from distressing stimuli and still engage in action. Future studies could also clarify the contexts
in which acceptance can be beneficial and suppression disruptive, and conversely when or for
whom suppression might be beneficial. This could translate to helping individuals expand their
lives instead of restricting behavior because of anxiety.
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APPENDIX A.
EMOTION REGULATION INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions for the Acceptance Condition
In a few minutes, you will be asked to watch a short movie clip and look at some
pictures. I would like you to listen to the following discussion about how to deal with emotions
that you may feel while you are watching.
Most people say that the movie and pictures shown in this research study are somewhat
distressing and produce emotions like anxiety and fear. Many people also think that their
negative emotions must be controlled or stopped. They may learn, from an early age, that they
can and should control negative thoughts and feelings. People are told things like “just stop
worrying” or “put it behind you”. Also, you see people controlling their feelings on many
occasions, such as at funerals or in crisis situations, and you may come to believe that people
should always try to control their emotions.
In some cases you can control your feelings. If you are feeling too cold in your house
you can turn up the heat. If you are feeling uncomfortable in a chair you can stand up and move
around. Certain actions can be taken to control how we are feeling on the inside. In the same
way, emotional control can sometimes work in temporary ways. Distraction, for example, can
help you feel less pain while you’re in a dentist’s chair.
However, it is often not so easy to control or stop emotions like anxiety, sadness, anger,
or fear. Just think of how difficult it is to follow through on another person’s suggestion to “just
calm down” or “just relax” when you are feeling upset. It’s not as easy as it sounds, right?
Given that we all experience some difficulty with emotions like fear, anxiety, and stress,
efforts to block these feelings are quite understandable. However, although self-control may
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work in many areas of your life, there are situations involving emotions where it might be
difficult or even impossible. Struggling against relatively natural emotions can actually make
your distress more intense and last longer, rather than making the situation better. Also, if you
try to suppress your emotions and are unable to do so, this may lead to feelings of failure, guilt,
or lack of control. Finally, your efforts to block out negative emotions may become a constant
battle, draining you of energy and happiness.
So, am I suggesting that you just give up on changing your emotional experiences? No,
what I’m suggesting is that there is an alternative to struggling or battling with your emotions
and it is called acceptance. Accepting your emotions means that you are willing to experience
them fully and that you don’t try to control or change your emotions in any way.
Am I proposing that you should just put up with discomfort and distress? No, what I’m
suggesting is that you can come to think about your emotions in a different way; not as
something that always needs to be contained or controlled in order for you to be OK, but as
natural reactions that happen, get strong, and fade away without leading to any awful
consequences and without you having to struggle or fight with your feelings at all.
Accepting emotions like fear, anxiety, and stress may be difficult, especially when common
sense tells you that these emotions are bad. There are times in life, however, when our commonsense reactions get us into trouble. Have you ever driven your car on a sheet of ice and lost
control? Usually, the mistake people make is that they try to correct the situation by turning in
the opposite direction from which they are skidding. This seems to make sense, but the more
effective approach is to do the opposite – to turn the wheel into the direction of the skidding.
What I am suggesting is that dealing effectively with your emotions may be very
similar. It is against your natural reaction to allow yourself to feel negative feelings. However,
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just like turning into the direction of the skidding is a better way of dealing with icy road
conditions, leaning into your emotions and fully experiencing them may be a better way of
dealing with emotional situations.
So, if emotions occur while you watch this short video or look at these pictures, try to
give up the struggle to suppress or control them. Allow yourself to accept and stay with your
emotions without trying to get rid of them. Do not try to distract yourself or otherwise lessen
your feelings, and instead allow yourself to feel your emotions as fully as possible. Just let your
emotions run their natural course and see how that goes.
Now look at the screen and watch the short film. When it is over remove your
headphones and you will receive more instructions.
Instructions for Suppression Condition
In a few minutes, you will be asked to watch a short movie clip and look at some
pictures. I would like you to listen to the following discussion about how to deal with emotions
that you may feel while you are watching.
Most people say that the video and pictures shown in this research study are somewhat
distressing and produce emotions like anxiety and fear. In addition, many people do not do
anything to try to control their emotional reactions, which makes the experience even more
distressing. Although experiencing anxiety and other negative emotions is normal when
watching this video and looking at these pictures, it is possible to experience these emotions at
lower levels if you really concentrate on controlling them.
There is a great deal of evidence that people can control their emotional reactions. You
see people controlling their emotions all of the time, such as at funerals or in crisis situations
where it is important to remain calm. There are many cases in which you can do simple things to
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control your feelings. If you are feeling too cold in your house you can turn up the heat. If you
are feeling uncomfortable in a chair you can stand up and move around. Certain actions can be
taken to control how we are feeling on the inside. In the same way, emotional control can often
work to change our experiences. For example, distraction can help you feel less pain while you
are in a dentist’s chair.
Think of it – we have all sorts of phrases in our language that refer to people controlling
their own emotional experiences. We often tell people to “calm down” when they are feeling
anxious or angry. We use phrases such as “grin and bear it” or “put it behind you” to
communicate that it is possible to make it through a difficult experience if you are able to control
your emotions. In challenging situations, people are frequently able to do things that help them
bring their emotions down to a more manageable level.
Given that we all have experienced some difficulty with emotions like fear, anxiety, and
stress, it is understandable that you would consider suppressing your emotional reactions to be a
difficult task. However, think of other areas in your life where you have been capable of selfcontrol. If you are like most people, you do not feel like jumping right out of bed when your
alarm clock goes off in the morning. But many times in your life you have gotten out of bed and
prepared yourself for school, work, or other obligations. At first , you may have had negative
feelings like fatigue or disappointment over having to get up, but you battled those feelings
successfully and started your day.
I’m sure there are other times in your life when you have not allowed your feelings to
take control. For instance, you might think of a time when you forced yourself to go to the gym
despite feeling tired or made yourself study for an important test even though you would have
preferred to relax. Although self-control can be hard at first, when you are successful you feel
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proud of yourself -- like you have accomplished something important. The same is true of
controlling your negative emotions. When you succeed at keeping your feelings under control,
you feel proud of yourself for dealing with with an emotional situation well. However, when
you just let your negative emotions run their own course and they intensify, you may end up
feeling discouraged, guilty, or out of control.
So, what exactly am I suggesting here? Basically, I am suggesting that you have more
control over your emotional reactions than you think. You can control how often and how
intense your emotions feel and you probably have done so successfully in the past. Although
many emotions fade away after a while, you should not have to put up with more discomfort and
distress than is necessary.
Rather than just allowing your feelings to run their own course, I would like you to really test
out your ability to control your emotional reactions. Whenever you experience emotions like
anxiety or fear while watching the movie clip and looking at the pictures, please try to control
them as much as possible. Try to suppress or push down your feelings, and attempt to minimize
the amount of anxiety and other emotions you feel in response to the images. See just how much
you can control your own distress and discomfort.
Now look at the screen and watch the short film. When it is over remove your
headphones and you will receive more instructions

Instructions for Control Condition
In a moment, you will be asked to watch a short movie clip and look at some pictures .
Please watch the video and then look at the pictures carefully. When looking at the images, there
may be an sound that you will hear. I would like you to identify the pitch of the sound as either
low or high as quickly as possible as you did in the first computer task. Now look at the screen
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and watch the short film. When it is over remove your headphones and you will receive more
instructions.
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